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Hip-Hip-Hurray for Illinois Taxpayers, or Is It
Too Early to Cheer?: An Analysis of In re
Consolidated Objections to Tax Levies of
School District No. 205, for Years 1991
Through 1996'
Whoever attentively considers the different
departments of power must perceive that, in a government
in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary,
from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because
it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The
executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword
of the community. The legislature not only commands the
purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights
of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the
contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse;
no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.'
INTRODUCTION

The football team at the North Boone School District in Rockford, Illinois
has been cheering for a number of years because of the new football helmets
and equipment the team has been receiving out of money from the Tort
Immunity Act.3 The team is receiving new equipment because the school
district of North Boone hopes to provide better safety for the football players
while reducing the school's tort liability. Not only has the school district used
taxpayers' money under the guise of the Tort Immunity Act to pay for new
football helmets, the "tort" money collected from taxpayers has also been used
by the school district to pay for stage padding, science lab supplies,

1.
2.
3.

715 N.E.2d 1212 (MI.App. Ct. 1999).
THE FEDERAUST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/9-101 to -107 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
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snowplowing and bleacher repair." Is this use of taxpayer money an abuse of
the Tort Immunity Act?
On the other hand, in another Rockford school,'the school district under
a court-initiated order levied a tax under the Local Government and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act to fund the elimination of
segregation practices in the school.' Because of these taxes levied under the
Tort Immunity Act, this particular Rockford school district for the past ten
years has been able to pay for the necessary desegregation measures ordered
by the court.
However, in August 1999, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District ruled that using funds from the Tort Immunity Act for purposes of
desegregation and discrimination violates the purpose and authority of the
Act.6 This means the school district will not have the necessary funds
available to continue its desegregation efforts in this Rockford school. Is this
use of the Tort Immunity Fund to desegregate schools an abuse of the Act?
This casenote will discuss and examine how the Local Government and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act ("Tort Immunity Act" or "the
Act") should be applied in Illinois based on a case of first impression: In re
ConsolidatedObjections to Tax Levies of School DistrictNo. 205, for Years
1991 Through 1996.' Section I of this casenote is divided into two segments.
Section A discusses the development and historical attributes of tort liability
by analyzing the common law development of tort liability and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Section B chronologically examines the development
and language modifications of the Tort Immunity Act in Illinois up to its
present status. Specific reference to the relevant sections of the current Tort
Immunity Act including the changes made with the enactment of new Public
Law 91-628 s will be discussed. Section 11 provides the factual basis for the
Second District appellate court's decision to limit the application of the Tort
Immunity Act.9 Section 11. is divided into a four-part analysis. Section A
elaborates on the appellant's main arguments for allowing the Act to fund the
remedies. Section B discusses the main arguments of the appellees against
using the Act to fund the desegregation remedies. Section C traces the

at A9.

4.

See New PolicyWould Limit Tort Expenses, ROCKFORD REG. STAR, Sept. 18,1999,

5. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 851 F. Supp.
905 (N.D. Ill. 1994). affd in part, rev'd in part, 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997).
6. In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist. No. 205, for Years 1991
Through 1996, 715 N.E.2d 1212 (Il1.App. Ct. 1999) (hereinafter In re Consol. Objections].
7. Id.
8. Act of Aug. 19, 1999, P.A. 91-628, § 9-107, 1999 111. Legis. Serv. 5084 (West).
9.

In re Consol. Objections, 715 N.E.2d at 1213-16.
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reasoning of the majority opinion to its conclusion. Section D analyzes the
key strengths and weaknesses of the appellate court's opinion. This section of
the casenote argues that the Second District appellate court' s analysis holding
the Tort Immunity Act inapplicable as a method of funding desegregation,
while logically and factually reasoned, is not practically based. Finally,
Section IV of this casenote addresses the future impact of this decision. This
section will look at the practical effects of ihis decision on the local
community and also analyze the issues the Illinois Supreme Court will be
facing if they decide to hear this case.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY LEADING UP TO THE TORT IMMUNITY ACT

To understand the Tort Immunity Act, one must first examine the
historical development of tort law. Originally, at common law, the only
remedy for a tort was monetary damages.'" Yet, at common law, not everyone
was held to be equally responsible for the payment of monetary damages in
tort.

At the outset, the federal government, states, and certain governmental
entities were held to be immune from the payment of tort liability under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity." This judicial doctrine of sovereign
immunity is an ancient concept, which precludes suits from being brought
against the government. This ancient principle was founded on the belief that
the "King can do no wrong"'" and on "the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends."" Over time, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was
further expanded to bar suits brought against governmental entities, political
divisions of the government, and officers or agents of these divisions. Thus,
based on this doctrine of sovereign immunity, not only was the government
immune from suits, but the states and their entities were also immune from
suits. However, in recent years both federal and state governments have either
modified this rule of sovereign immunity or completely abolished the rule.

10. See Levy v. McKiel, 541 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Il1.App. Ct. 1989) (McLaren, J.,
dissenting).
11. See Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P'ship, 692 N.E.2d. 1177,1180 (M1.1998);
see also U.S. CONST. amend Xi. See generally Barnett v. Zion Park Dist., 665 N.E.2d 808 (111.

1996).

12. See MICHAELPOIEIuE & BRuCE OTEY. ILINOiS TORT LAW 664 (1985) (quoting
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)).
13. Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353.
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Originally, like the federal government and numerous other states, Illinois
adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity.14 Illinois also expanded the
doctrine's immunity to the state's governmental units." Thus, under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in Illinois, the state and its governmental
entities were immune from suits.
Nevertheless, the broad scope of the doctrine of sovereign immunity did
not have a perpetual duration in Illinois. In 1959, the Illinois courts abolished
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in its application to municipal corporations
and governmental entities in tort actions.16 Excerpts from Molitorv. Kaneland
Community Unit District No. 302 are helpful in understanding the Illinois
Supreme Court's reasoning for the abolishment of sovereign immunity:
It is a basic concept underlying the whole law of torts
today that liability follows negligence, and that individuals
and corporations are responsible for the negligence of their
agents and employees acting in the course of their
employment. The doctrine of governmental immunity runs
directly counter to that basic concept. What reasons, then
are so impelling as to allow a school district, as a quasimunicipal corporation, to commit wrongdoing without any
responsibility to its victims, while any individual or private
corporation would be called to task in court for such tortious
conduct?
...
'The whole doctrine of governmental immunity
from liability for tort rests upon a rotten foundation. It is
almost incredible that in this modem age of comparative
sociological enlightenment, and in a republic, the medieval
absolutism supposed to be implicit in the maxim "the King
can do no wrong," should exempt the various branches of
the government from liability for their torts, and that the
entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of
the government should be imposed upon the single
individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed
among the entire community constituting the government.

14. See Harinek, 692 N.E.2d at 1182.
15. See generally Harinek, 692 N.E.2d 1177; Barnett,665 N.E.2d 808.
16. See Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (111. 1959)
(monumental Illinois case which determined that school districts would no longer be immune
under the Governmental Tort Immunity Act for the negligent acts of their employees); see also
Walker v. Forest Pres. Dist., 190 N.E.2d 296 (111. 1963).
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where it could be borne without hardship upon any
individual, and where it justly belongs." 7
In response to the abolishment of tort immunity in Molitor, the Illinois
General Assembly in 1965 enacted the Local Government and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act.s The General Assembly had three major
reasons for adopting this Act. The first main purpose for the adoption of the
Act was to assert that governmental entities would no longer be immune from
liability." The second main purpose for the adoption of the Act was to
provide these governmental entities with an extensive list of immunities that
would still remain after the adoption of the Act by the state. ° The immunities
that would still be allowed were based on the entities' specific governmental
functions. For example, based on Illinois Revised Statute, chapter 85,
paragraph 2-104, an entity would still be immune from suits for adopting or
failing to adopt a particular law or failing to enforce any law." Third, the final
purpose behind the General Assembly's creation of the Tort Immunity Act was
to provide local and public governmental entities with a way to raise revenue
for the tort claims and judgments now enforceable against them.'
Following Molitor and the adoption of the Tort Immunity Act in Illinois,
the next step was ratification of the Molitor test and the Act by the Illinois
Constitution. In 1970, the Illinois Constitution validated both Molitor and the
Tort Immunity Act by expressly abrogating the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.' Specifically, Article XII, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution
reads as follows: "Except as the General Assembly may provide by law,

17.
1943)).

163 N.E.2d at 93,94 (quoting Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 136 P.2d 480,482 (N.M.

18.

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1-101 to -107 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).

20.

See Burdinie, 565 N.E.2d at 658.

19. See Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 565 N.E.2d 654, 658 (11. 1990),
overruled by McCuen v. Peoria Park Dist., 163 fI1. 2d 125 (1994).
21. See id. Other examples based on statutory provisions where governmental entities
are immune from liability include: (1) municipal liability for negligence connected with the

administration of permits, licenses, certificates, and other authorizations; (2)for negligence
connected with the inspection of property for health or safety hazards; (3) for negligence

connected with injuries resulting from unsafe conditions of municipal property if the local

government entity had no actual or constructive notice of the unreasonably unsafe condition;
(4) for negligence resulting in injuries occurring on public property intended for recreational
purposes, unless the local public entity is guilty of willful and wanton conduct; (5) for the
negligent failure to supervise an activity on public property; (6) or for negligence resulting in
injuries incurred during participation in hazardous recreational activity. Id.
22. See 745 ILL COM. STAT. ANN. 10/9-101 to -107 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
23. ILL. CONST. art. XII, § 4; see also Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P'ship, 692
N.E.2d 1182 (ill. 1998).
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sovereign immunity in this State is abolished."' Currently, constitutional
provisions and legislative prerogatives as embodied in the Tort Immunity Act
proscribe tort liability in Illinois.'
B.

EVOLUTION OF THE TORT IMMUNITY ACT LEADING TO ITS CURRENT
STATUS

Like many other areas of the law, the Tort Immunity Act is a continually
evolving statute. Two considerable changes in the statute have taken place
since its introduction, and these modifications are relevant to the outcome in
In re Consolidated Objections to Tax Levies of School DistrictNo. 205, for
Years 1991 Through 1996.2 The first change became effective on November
of 1986, with Public Act 84-143 1. Before the introduction of Public Act 841431, Section 9-102 read: "A local public entity is empowered and directed to
pay any tortjudgment or settlement for which it or an employee while acting
within the scope of his employment is liable in the manner provided in this
Article." 27 The original Act places no limitation on the type of damages or
settlements that would be covered by the Act. Thus, the broad language of
"any tort judgment or settlement" used by the legislature left open the
possibility that public entities would have to pay for all tort damages
regardless of whether they were injunctive, compensatory, or punitive.
However, with the enactment of Public Act 84-1431, the legislature
narrowed the broad language in section 9-102 by inserting the language of
"compensatory damages" into the statute.2 Section 9-102 now reads: "Alocal
public entity is empowered and directed to pay any tortjudgment orsettlement
for compensatorydamagesfor which it or an employee while acting within the
scope of his employment is liable in the manner provided in this Article."'
This narrowing of the act is significant because this case turns on whether or
not injunctive remedies ordered by the lower courts will be considered
"compensatory damages" within the current reading of section 9-102 of the
Tort Immunity Act.
The second and most recent change to the Tort Immunity Act took place
on August 19, 1999, the day after the appellate court held that the Tort
Immunity Act could not be used to fund desegregation and discrimination
24.
25.
26.
27.

ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
See Burdine, 565 N.E.2d at 658.
715 N.E.2d 1212 (I1. App. Ct. 1999).
Act of Nov. 25, 1986, P.A. 84-1431, § 9-102, 1986 Ill. Laws 3748 (emphasis

28.
29.

Id.
745 I. Comp. STAT. ANN. I0/9-102 (West 1993) (emphasis added).

added).
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remedies. On August 19, the Illinois legislature approved Public Act 91-628,
effective January 1,2000.0 Public Act 91-628 is important because it further
defines the uses for which funds can be collected by governmental entities
under the Act. According to Public Act 91-628, the General Assembly found
that the "purpose of this Section is to provide an extraordinary tax for funding
expenses relating to tort liability, insurance, and risk management programs."'"
Again, this change is significant because this addition to the Act may illustrate
that the legislature was intending to narrow the Tort Immunity Act to include
only expenses relating to tort liability.
Accordingly, because statutory construction of the Tort Immunity Act is
one of the major focal points of this case, the current sections of Article 10,
sections 9-102, 9-103 and 9-107 of the Illinois Local Government and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act are set forth below in pertinent
part:
745 ILCS 10/9-102 Payment.of judgments or settlements
compromise and settlement of claims
A local public entity is empowered and directed to pay any
tort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages for
which it or an employee while acting within the scope of his
employment is liable in the manner provided in this Article.
All other provisions of this Article, including but not limited
to the payment of judgments and settlement in installments,
the issuance of bonds, the maintenance of rates and charges,
and the levy of taxes shall be equally applicable to
judgments or settlements relating to both a local public
entity or an employee and those undertakings assumed by a
local public entity in intergovernmental joint self-insurance
contracts. A local public entity may make payments to
settle or compromise a claim or action which has been or
might be filed or instituted against it when the governing
body or person vested by law ordinance with authority to
make over-all policy decisions for such entity considers it
advisable to enter into such a settlement or compromise. 2
Public Act 91-628, Section 9-103

30.
31.
32.

Act of Aug. 19, 1999, P.A. 91-628, § 9-107, 1999 IM.Legis. Serv. 5084 (West).
Id.
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/9-102.
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(a) A local public entity may protect itself against any
liability, property damage or against any liability or loss
which may be imposed upon it or one of its employees for
a tortious act under Federal or State common or statutory
law, or imposed upon it under the Workers' Compensations
Act, the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act, or the
Unemployment Insurance Act by means including, but not
limited to, insurance, individual or joint self-insurance,
including all operating and administrative costs and
expenses directly associated therewith, claims services and
risk management directly attributable to loss prevention and
loss reduction, legal services directly attributable to the
insurance, self-insurance, or joint self-insurance program,
educational, inspectional, and supervisory services directly
relating to loss prevention and loss reduction, or
participation in a reciprocal insurer as provided in Sections
72, 76, and 81 of the Illinois Insurance Code. Insurance
shall be carried with a company authorized by the
Department of Insurance to write such insurance coverage
in Illinois."
33.

§ 9-103, 1999 111.Legis. Serv. at 5083.

(a-5) A local public entity may individually or jointly self-insure
provided it complies with any other statutory requirements specifically
related to individual or joint self-insurance by local public entities.

Whenever the terms "self insure" or "self-insurance" are utilized within
this Act, such term shall apply to both individual and joint self-insurance.
The expenditure of funds of a local public entity to protect itself or its
employees against liability isproper for any local public entity that has
individually self-insured may establish reserves for expected losses for

any liability or loss for which the local public entity is authorized to
purchase insurance under this Act. The decision of the local public entity
to establish a reserve and the amount of the reserve shall be based on
reasonable actuarial or insurance underwriting evidence. Property taxes
shall not be levied or extended if the effect is to increase the reserve
beyond 125% of the actuary's or insurance underwriter's estimated
ultimate losses at the 95% confidence level. Certification of the amount
of the reserve shall be made by the independent auditor, actuary, or
insurance underwriter and included in the annual report. The annual
report shall also list all expenditures from the reserve or from proertv
taxes levied or extended for tort immunity purposes. Total claims

payments and total reserves must be listed in aggregate amounts. All
other exenditures must be identified individually. A local public entity
that maintains a self-insurance reserve or that levies and extends a
property tax for tort immunity purposes must include in its audit or
annual report any expenditures made from the property tax levy or self-

(Vol. 20

20001

HIP-HIP-HURRAY FOR ILINOIS TAXPAYERS

Public Act 91-628, Section 9-107
(a) The General Assembly finds that the gurose of this
Section is to provide an extraordinary tax for funding
exenses relating to tort liability. insurance, and risk
management programs. Thus. the tax has been excluded
from various limitations otherwise anlicable to tax levies.
Notwithstanding the extraordinary nature of the tax
authorized by this Section. however, it has become apparent
that some units of local government are using the tax
revenue to fund expenses more DroerlY Raid from &eneral

operating funds. These uses of the revenue are inconsistent

with the limited purpose of the tax authorization.
Therefore. the General Assembly declares, as a matter 0f
policy, that (i the use of the tax revenue authorized by this
Section for RuMoses not expressly authorized under this Act
is imvroper and (ii) the grovisions of this Section shall be
strictly construed consistent with this declaration and the
Act's express DuMoses.
(b) A local public entity may annually levy or have levied
on its behalf taxes upon all taxable property within its
territory at a rate that will produce a sum that will be
sufficient to: (i) pay the cost of insurance, individual or joint
self-insurance (including reserves thereon), including all
operating and administrative costs and expenses directly

insurance reserve within the scope of the audit or annual reort.

(b) A local public entity may contract for or purchase any of the
guaranteed capital as provided for in Section 56 of the Illinois Insurance
Code. The expenditure of funds of the local public entity for said
contract or purchase is proper for any local public entity.
(c) Any insurance company that provides insurance coverage to a local
public entity shall utilize any immunities or may assert any defenses to
which the insured local public entity or its employees are entitled. Public
entities which are individually or jointly self-insured shall be entitled to
assert all of the immunities provided by this Act or by common law or
statute on behalf of themselves or their employees unless the local public
shall elect by action of their corporate authorities or specifically contract

to waive in whole or in part such immunities.

(d) Within 30 days after January 1, 1991, and within 30 days after each
January 1 thereafter, local public entities that are individually or jointly
self-insured to protect against liability under the Workers' Compensation
Act and the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act shall file with the
Industrial Commission a report indicating an election to self-insure.
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associated therewith, claims services and risk management
directly attributable to loss prevention and loss reduction,
legal services directly attributable to the insurance, selfinsurance, or joint self-insurance program and educational,
inspectional, and supervisory services directly relating to
loss prevention and loss reduction, participation in a
reciprocal insurer as provided in Sections 72, 76, and 81 of
the Illinois Insurance Code, or participation in a reciprocal
insurer, all as provided in settlements of judgments under
Section 9-102 including all costs and reserves directly
attributable to being a member of an insurance pool, under
Section 9-103, (ii)pay the costs of and principal and interest
on bonds issued under Section 9-105; (iii) pay judgments
and settlements under Section 9-104; and (iv) discharge
obligations under Section 34-18.1 of the School Code, as
now or hereafter amended, and to pay the cost of risk
management programs. Provided it complies with any other
applicable statutory requirements, the local public entity
may self-insure and establish reserves for expected losses
for any property damage or for any liability or loss for
which the local public entity is authorized to levy or have
levied on its behalf taxes for the purchase of insurance or the
payment of judgments or settlements under this Section.
The decision of the board to establish a reserve shall be
based on reasonable actuarial or insurance underwriting
evidence and subject to the limits and reporting provisions
in Section 9-103. 34

34.

Id. at 5084-86.
Funds raised pursuant to this Section shall only be used for the
purposes specified in this Act, including protection against and reduction
of any liability or loss described hereinabove and under Federal or State
common or statutory law, the Workers' Compensation Act, the Workers'
Occupational Disease Act and the Unemployment Insurance Act. Funds
raised pursuant to this Section may be invested in any manner in which
other funds of local public entities may be invested under Section 2 of the
Public Funds Investment Act. Interest on such funds shall be used only
for purposes for which the funds can be used or, if surplus, must be used
for abatement of property taxes levied by the local taxing entity.
A local public entity may enter into intergovernmental contracts with
a term of not to exceed 12 years for the provision of joint self-insurance
which contracts may include an obligation to pay a proportional share of
a general obligation or revenue bond or other debt instrument issued by
a local public entity which is a party to the intergovernmental contract

(Vol. 20
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and is authorized by the terms of the contract to issue the bond or other
debt instrument. Funds due under such contracts shall not be considered
debt under any constitutional or statutory limitation and the local public
entity may levy or have levied on its behalf taxes to pay for its
proportional share under the contract.
Funds raised pursuant to
intergovernmental contracts for the provision ofjoint self-insurance may
only be used for the payment of any cost, liability or loss against which
a local public entity may protect itself or self-insure pursuant to Section
9-103 or for the payment of which such entity may levy a tax pursuant to
the Section, including tortjudgments or settlements, costs associated with
the issuance, retirement or refinancing of the bonds or other debt
instruments, the repayment of the principal or interest of the bonds or
other debt instruments, the costs of the administration of the joint selfinsurance fund, consultant, and risk care management programs or the
costs of insurance. Any surplus returned to the local public entity under
the terms of the intergovernmental contract shall be used only for
purposes set forth in subsection (a) of Section 9-103 and Section 9-(107)
or for abatement of property taxes levied by the local taxing entity.
Any tax levied under this Section shall be levied and collected in like
manner with the general taxes of the entity and shall be exclusive of and
in addition to the amount of tax that entity is now or may hereafter be
authorized to levy for general purposes under any statute which may limit
the amount of tax which that entity may levy for general purposes. The
county clerk of the county in which any part of the territory of the local
taxing entity is located, in reducing tax levies under the provisions of any
Act concerning the levy and extension of taxes, shall not consider any tax
provided for by this Section as a part of the general tax levy for the
purposes of the entity nor include such tax within any limitation of the
percent of the assessed valuation upon which taxes are required to be
extended for such entity.
With respect to taxes levied under this Section, either before, on or
after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1994: (1) Those taxes
are excepted from and shall not be included within the rate limitation
imposed by law on taxes levied for general corporate purposes by the
local public entity authorized to levy a tax under this Section. (2) Those
taxes that a local public entity has levied in reliance on this Section and
that are excepted under paragraph (1) from the rate limitation imposed by
law on taxes levied for general corporate purposes by the local public
entity are not invalid because of any provision of the law authorizing the
local public entity's tax levy for general corporate purposes that may be
construed or may have been construed to restrict or limit those taxes
levied, and those taxes are hereby validated. This validation of taxes
levied applies to all cases pending on or after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of 1994. (3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to a
hospital or organized under Article 170 or 175 of the Township Code,
under the Town Hospital Act, or under the Township Non-Sectarian
Hospital Act and do not give any authority to levy taxes on behalf of such
a hospital in excess of the rate limitation imposed by law on taxes levied
for general corporate purposes. A hospital organized under Article 170
or 175 of the Township Code, under the Town Hospital Act, or under the
Township Non-Sectarian Hospital Act is not prohibited from levying

NORTHERN ILINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 20

II. IN RE CONSOLDATED OBJECTIONS TO TAX LEVIES OF SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 205, FOR YEARS 1991 THROUGH 199635
A. CASE FACTS

In March of 1994, in People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education,
School DistrictNo. 2 0 5 ,36 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois determined that the Rockford school district had
intentionally discriminated against African Americans and Hispanics, violating
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Based upon
these violations, 38 the district court issued a Comprehensive Remedial Order
requiring the Rockford school district to desegregate and eliminate
discrimination in the school district.39 The district court at this juncture.
taxes in support of tort liability bonds if the taxes do not cause the
hospital's aggregate tax rate from exceeding the rate limitation imposed
by law on taxes levied for general corporate purposes.
Revenues derived from such tax shall be paid to the treasurer of the

Id.

35.
36.
1997).

local taxing entity as collected and used for the purposes of this Section
and of Section 9-102, 9-103, 9-104 or 9-105, as the case may be. If
payments on account of such taxes are insufficient during any year to
meet such purposes, the entity may issue tax anticipation warrants against
the current tax levy in the manner provided by statute.
715 N.E.2d 1212 (Ii. App. Ct. 1999).
851 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. flI. 1994), affld in part,rev'd inpart, Ill F.3d 528(7th Cir.

37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause provides that states
cannot "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
38. Violations included: (1) discriminatory use of "tracking," or grouping of students
by their ability level based on students performance on academic tests; (2) public labeling of
students by color-coding them according to track; (3) use of special programs to further
segregate the children by race within the public school; (4) failure to provide minority children
with an equal opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities; (5) failure to address the
discrimination problem when made aware of the problem. See id. at 912-1001; see also
Vanessa G. Tanaka, Comment, People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education and the
Spectrum of Race-ConsciousRemedies, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 347, 347.
39. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 89 C
20168, 1996 WL 364802 (N.D. III. June 7, 1996), aff'd inpart,rev'd inpart,111 F.3d 528 (7th
Cir. 1997). The remedial order required that the Rockford school district begin to immediately
desegregate the school district and end discrimination by instituting a policy of racial quotas.
It also required that the racial makeup of non-elective remedial classes and extracurricular
activities match the racial composition of the school within five percent. See Tanaka, supra
note 38, at 348. The district court order also prohibited tracking, required that the test score
disparity between white and minority students be halved, and mandated that school disciplinary
action should be equal in proportion between white and minority students, unless the subjective
criteria of the district discipline policies were eliminated. Id.
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awarded no monetary damages to the plaintiffs of People Who Care. The only
award made was for injunctive relief; no dollar amount in damages was
demanded.' °
This equitable relief order originally issued by the district court in 1989
to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination against Black and Latino students
in the Rockford school district has been continually in effect in various stages
until the present. Since the original consent order, the Rockford school district
has levied more than $80 million in taxes4 in order to pay for system-wide
remedies including student assignment remedies, education programs, and
long-term capital improvements. The funds for these remedies have been
obtained by the district through taxes levied and bonds issued against the real
estate taxes of the taxpayers under the pretext of the Tort Immunity Act.42
The facts of the prior case, People Who Care, led to the current case that
is at issue in this casenote. Based on the Comprehensive Remedial Order
issued by the district court in People Who Care, the Rockford school district
was required to fund these desegregation remedies in order to comply with the
court-mandated order to desegregate. The Rockford school district, unable to
pay for the remedies from their own budget, levied a tax against taxpayers in
the Rockford school district to raise the necessary funds to pay for the
desegregation remedies. Pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act, the school district
believed that it had the authority to levy this additional tax against the
taxpayers to fund the tort damage award.
Thus, taxpayers in the Rockford school district faced an additional real
estate tax to pay for the desegregation remedies. In 1991, nine cases were
brought by taxpayers objecting to the payment of the real estate tax levied by
the Rockford Board of Education District No. 205 under the Tort Immunity
Act. In 1996, the original nine taxpayers consolidated their cases with an
40. See In re the Application of the County Collector, Nos. 92 TX 90,93 TX 97,94 TX
115 (17th Jud. Cir. Winnebago County, II. Nov. 4,1997), available at http://members.aol.com/
mikobr/rapp.txt [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion]. "It is apparent that in this case the
provisions of the Second Interim Order are remedial in nature and guided by equitable

principles. They are not compensatory damages awarded to anyone of the plaintiffs known as
PWC." Id.
41. Statement in Support of the Request for Leave to Appeal Filed by the People Who
Care at 2, In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist. No. 205, for Years 1991 Through
1996, 715 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (No. 2-98-0706).
42. See Brief for Appellees, In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist. No.
205, for Years 1991 Through 1996, 715 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (No. 2-98-0706).
During the years 1991 to 1993, the parties agreed that certain remedial steps would be taken to
desegregate the school and these remedial programs would be funded through the Tort
Immunity Act to at least a $6.8 million base annual operating budget. Following 1993, up until
the 1996 taxes were collected, the district had levied under the Tort Immunity Act a staggering
$144 million. Id. at 3-4.
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additional 16,146 other taxpayers on Winnebago County properties to object
to the tax levies issued by the Rockford school district under the 43Tort
Immunity Act, claiming that the school district had violated Illinois law.
B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Prior to the full adjudication of this case, the Rockford school district
entered into two interim agreements attempting to formulate a solution to
resolve the desegregation and discrimination issues in the Rockford school
district." In July of 1989, the first interim order was entered modifying a
reorganization plan adopted by the district.4' On April 24, 1991, the second
interim order was entered requiring the Rockford school district to undertake
certain preliminary remedial actions to benefit People Who Care."6 The
second interim order specifically addressed the funding of these remedial
measures under state law with particular reference to the Tort Immunity Act
as a source of revenue beyond normal statutory levies for school purposes.
This second consent decree found that the payment of these preliminary
of a liability, tort
desegregation remedies would constitute the payment
4
Act.
Immunity
Tort
the
under
settlement
judgment, or
Following the first and second interim orders finding that the school
district would be allowed to levy a tax to pay for the desegregation remedies,
the tax objectors in 1991 began filing tax complaints. At this point, the
Rockford school district intervened in the proceedings and had the tax
objectors' cases removed to federal district court." At this stage in the
proceedings, the federal district court determined that the Rockford school
district could be authorized to use the Tort Immunity Act to fund the required
activities under the remedial order. The district court reasoned that the Tort
Immunity Act allowed for the funding of the school desegregation remedies, 49
and denied the tax objections on the merits."

43. See In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist. No. 205, for Years 1991
Through 1996, 715 N.E.2d 1212, 1212 (I1. App. Ct. 1999) [hereinafter In re Consol.

Objections].
44. See In re Consol. Objections, 715 N.E.2d at 1212; see also Memorandum Opinion,
supra note 40.
45. See In re ConsoL Objections, 715 N.E.2d at 1213.
46. I L
47. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 40.
48. See In re Consol. Objections, 715 N.E.2d at 1213.
49. See In re the Application of the County Collector, 918 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill.

1996), rev'd, 96 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 1996).
50.

See In re Consol. Objections, 715 N.E.2d at 1213.

20001

HIP-HIP-HURRAY FOR ILLINOIS TAXPAYERS

The tax objectors then appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.5
On appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed on jurisdictional grounds, stating that
because the tax objectors' case involved issues of state tax law, the case should
to federal court and remanded the 1991 to 1993 actions
not have been removed
52
back to state court.
When the case was heard at the state court level, the trial court granted
the tax objectors' motion on summary judgment, holding that the Act was
improperly used to pay for remedial measures and denied the summary
judgment motion on behalf of the school district and the plaintiffs in People
Who Care.53 At the triai court level, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
308, 5' the court then certified three major questions: First, "'[w]hether the
See In re the Application of the County Collector, 96 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 1996).
d at 896.
The tax objectors' right to recovery is completely dependent upon the
proper construction of the Tort Immunity Act, i.e. whether the costs of
complying with the equitable relief mandated by the Second Interim
Order constitute "compensatory damages" under the Act. The school
district could not expand its authority to levy taxes by entering into a
consent decree.
Id.at 896 (citing Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 814 F. 2d 332, 341-42 (7th Cir. 1987) ("A
consent decree is not a method by which state agencies may liberate themselves from the
statutes enacted by the legislature that created them.")). "Because the parties to a consent
decree 'cannot consent to do something together that they lack the power to do individually,'
the consent decree does not even potentially inject a federal law issue into this case." Id.
(quoting Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995)).
53. See In re Consol. Objections, 715 N.E.2d at 1213. At the request of the tax
objectors, the trial judge, Chief Judge Rapp, bifurcated the proceedings between issues relating
to whether the tax levies were authorized under the Tort Immunity Act and issues relating to
various procedural defenses and the calculation of refunds. Id. Issues relating to procedural
defenses and the calculation of refunds are still pending. Id.
54. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308, which allows for "Interlocutory Appeals by
Permission," provides:
(a) Requests. When the trial court, in making an interlocutory order not
otherwise appealable, finds that the order involves a question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, the court shall so state in writing, identifying
the question of law involved. Such a statement may be made at the time
of the entry of the order or thereafter on the court's own motion or on
motion of any party. The Appellate Court may thereupon in its discretion
allow an appeal from the order.
(b) How Sought. The appeal will be sought by filing an application for
leave to appeal with the clerk of the Appellate Court within 14 days after
the entry of the order in the trial court or the making of the prescribed
statement by the trial court, whichever is later. An original and three
copies of the application shall be filed.
(c) Application; Answer. The application shall contain a statement of the
facts necessary to an understanding of the question of law determined by
51.
52.
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Rockford School District... was authorized by the Illinois Local Government
Employees Tort Immunity Act... to levy taxes to fund remedies agreed to by
the District and/or ordered by the Federal Court in People Who Care v.
Rockford Board of Education . ... "';" second, "'[w]hether the [School]
District was authorized by the Tort Immunity Act to levy taxes to pay the debt
service on general obligation bonds issued to fund capital improvement
remedies agreed to by the district or ordered by the Federal Court in the People
Who Care case'";- and third, "'[w]hether [the] taxpayers are precluded from
challenging any of the aforesaid taxes under principles of res judicata or
collateral estoppel."' 7

the order of the trial court; a statement of the question itself; and a
statement of the reasons why a substantial basis exists for a difference of
opinion on the question and why an immediate appeal may materially
advance the termination of the litigation. The application shall be
accompanied by an original supporting record (Rule 328), containing the
order appealed from and other parts of the trial court record necessary for
the determination of the application for permission to appeal. Within 14
days after the due date of the application, an adverse party may file an
answer in opposition, with copies in the number required for the
application, together with an original of a supplementary supporting
record containing any additional parts of the record the adverse party
desires to have considered by the Appellate Court. The application and
answer shall be submitted without oral argument unless otherwise
ordered.
(d) Record; Briefs. If leave to appeal is allowed, any party may request
that an additional record on appeal be prepared as provided in Rule 321
et seq., or the court may order the appellant to file the record, which shall
be filed within 35 days of the date on which such leave was allowed. The
appellant shall file a brief in the reviewing court within the same 35 days.
Otherwise the schedule and requirements for briefs shall be as provided
in Rules 341 through 344. If the reviewing court so orders, an abstract
shall be prepared and filed as provided in Rule 342.
(e) Stay. The application for permission to appeal or the granting thereof
shall not stay proceedings in the trial court unless the trial court or the
Appellate Court or a judge thereof shall so order.
ILL Sup. CT. R. 308.
55. See In re ConsoL Objections,715 N.E.2d at 1213. In addressing this question, the
trial court was attempting to determine if in fact the Rockford school district was authorized to
levy taxes to fund the remedies. Also, if they were authorized to use the Tort Immunity Act,
at what point in the history of these two cases was the school district authorized to levy taxes?
The trial court considered three separate time periods: (1) following the 1991 consent decree;
(2) after the school district was adjudicated guilty in 1994 and ordered to provide a
comprehensive remedy; and (3) after the Comprehensive Remedial Order was entered into in
1996 and the district was expressly ordered by the federal court to use the Tort Immunity Act
levy to fund the remedies. I. at 1213-14.
56. Id. at 1214.
57. Id.
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Originally, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District denied the

8
school district and the intervenors' permissive interlocutory appeal." The
school district then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, who again denied
5
their motion for a permissive interlocutory appeal. ' However, when the
Illinois Supreme Court denied the school district and intervenors' interlocutory
appeal, it also entered a supervisory order vacating the Second District
appellate court's refusal to hear the interlocutory appeal. At this time, the
Illinois Supreme Court directed the appellate court to hear the interlocutory
appeal and certify the questions on the merits.6 The Illinois Appellate Court
for the Second District proceeded to hear the case and determined that the
injunctive relief ordered by the district court in the People Who Carecase was
6
not capable of being funded under the authority of the Tort Immunity Act. '

IMI. ANALYSIS
A. MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR FUNDING THE REMEDIES THROUGH THE TORT
IMMUNITY ACT

The Rockford school district made two main arguments in an effort to
support the position that the Tort Immunity Act was in fact designed to fund
injunctive remedies. The school district's first argument involved the
interpretation of the language used in the construction of the Tort Immunity
Act. Second, the school district argued that public policy supported an
interpretation of the Tort Immunity Act that included funding for injunctive
remedies.
Regarding the first main point, the school district contended that the Tort
Immunity Act was broad enough to include both monetary damages and62

context.
injunctive remedies when the Act was read in its complete statutory

63
Pursuant to Scadron v. City of Des Plaines and Stone v. Department of
Employment Security Boardof Review," the Rockford school district argued

58.

Id. at 1213.

61.

Id.

59.
60.

Id.
Id.

62. Brief for Appellants at 32-33, In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist.
No. 205, for Years 1991 Through 1996,715 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (No. 2-98-0706).
63. 606 N.E.2d. 1154, 1163 (I1. 1992) (applying the general rules of statutory
construction wherein the language of a statute must be viewed as a whole, such that each section
of statute is examined in relation to every other section, and different sections of a statute must
be read together as a whole).
64. 602 N.E.2d 808, 809 (iI. 1994) (applying the general rule of construction that the
language in each section of a statute must be interpreted in light of the language of the entire
statute).

NORTHERN IWNOIS UNVERSIT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

that the court must interpret the Act in its entirety. Thus, the school district
contended, when section 9-102 of the Act was read in conjunction with section
9-107, the school district had the authority to levy taxes regardless of whether
the damages were monetary or injunctive.'
Next, the school district argued that the phrase "compensatory damages"
included damages for injunctive remedies.' The district reasoned that the sole
intention of the General Assembly in 1986 in adding the language
"compensatory damages" to the statute was to mark a distinction between
compensatory damages and punitive damages only.'7 The district further
highlights this fact by demonstrating that the word "damages," based on its
plain meaning, encompasses the remedies being sought in the People Who

Care case."
The second main argument that the school district focused on was the
underlying public policy reasons behind the Act. The district argued that
public policy principles support an interpretation of the Tort Immunity Act
wherein the Act includes funding for injunctive remedies. The first policy
argument that the district made was that the Act must be interpreted as
providing a mechanism for raising funds to pay for tort remedies of all types.69
If the Tort Immunity Act did not include funding for injunctive remedies, the
only possible way a state or local governmental entity could receive the
necessary funding to comply with a court-mandated injunctive order would be
to involve the federal government pursuant to Missouri v. Jenkins." Federal
65. Brief for Appellants at 37.
66. See id at 38-39.
67. Id. at 39-40.
68. See id. at 39.
69. Id. at 51.
70. 495 U.S. 33 (1990). The case concerned a finding by a district court in 1984 that
the Kansas City, Missouri, School District ("KCMSD") and the State of Missouri had operated
a segregated school system within the KCMSD. Id at 37. The district court ordered KCMSD
and the State of Missouri to enforce certain remedies to eliminate the vestiges of state-imposed
segregation. The district court further ordered that the cost of these remedies was to be shared
by the State and KCMSD. However, the State could not raise the necessary funds to support
these remedies, forcing the district court to utilize its broad equitable powers to order a property
tax increase. Id. at 38-39. The State appealed. Eventually, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, reasoning that while the district court could not itself impose a tax increase,
it was still within the federal court's power to alternatively order a local governmental body to
levy its own taxes.
The District Court believed that it had no alternative to imposing a tax
increase. But there was an alterative, the very one outlined by the Court
of Appeals: it [the District Court] could have authorized or required
KCMSD to levy property taxes at a rate adequate to fund the
desegregation remedy and could have enjoined the operation of state laws
that would have prevented KCMSD from exercising this power....
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involvement of this sort would lead to unnecessary interference in the affairs

of the local and state governments.
The next policy argument raised by the school district stressed the benefit
of the prompt vindication of citizen rights, something that would be possible
if the Tort Immunity Act was allowed to fund injunctive remedies." If the Act
is not allowed to fund injunctive remedies, the remedy for injuries incurred by
the minority students will be further delayed.
The school district raised a third public policy concern emphasizing the
importance of governmental accountability in circumstances where the law has
recognized an injury.' The district argued that if the Tort Immunity Act does
not provide the funding for injunctive remedies then these minority students
will have no appropriate remedy. Citing the Illinois Constitution, the district
argued, "[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property, or regulation.
He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely and promptly."' Without
a method to fund all tort remedies a citizen's right to an appropriate and timely
remedy will not be achieved.
The last public policy concern the school district addressed was that a
narrow interpretation of the Tort Immunity Act leads to unproductive efforts
and a waste of public funds. 7' The school district's final punch is, regardless
of how the school district pays for these court-mandated desegregation
It is therefore clear that a local government with taxing authority may

be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit set by state statute where
there is reason based upon the Constitution for not observing the statutory
limitation.... To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the
obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill
the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them.
Id. at 51, 57. The impact of this decision is that it gives the federal courts the power to
authorize states to raise the bar on their limited taxing authority set by state statute. By
increasing the state's taxing power, the state is able to raise enough money to pay for the
necessary court-ordered remedies. Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy provides a strong dissent
challenging the constitutionality of the majority's decision, contending that the federal court
does not have the authority to allow states to raise the bar on their taxing authority:
The premise of the Court's analysis, I submit, is infirm. Any purported
distinction between direct imposition of a tax by the federal court and an
order commanding the school district to impose the tax is but a
convenient formalism where the court's action is predicated on
elimination of state-law limitations on the school district's taxing
authority.
Id. at 63-65; see also Brief for Appellants at 52.
71. See Brief for Appellants at 53.
72. See id. at 54.
73. See idat 55.
74. See id. at 58.
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remedies, the school district cannot avoid its obligation to remedy violations
on the grounds of fiscal inability." The school district will have to raise the
funds in one way or another to pay for the desegregation remedies and a
narrow reading of the Tort Immunity Act will only force the school district to
be more creative in the manner in which they raise the funds from taxpayers.
B. MAIN ARGUMENTS AGAINST ALLOWING THE TORT IMMUNITY ACT TO
FUND THE REMEDIES

The tax objectors formulated four major arguments supporting the
position that the Tort Immunity Act should not be used to fund injunctive

remedies. First, the tax objectors argued that the Tort Immunity Act should be
viewed narrowly because of its status as a tax statute. The tax objectors argued
that under a strict constructionist reading of the Tort Immunity Act, it did not
include equitable remedies. The second main position of the tax objectors was
that the legislature limited the Tort Immunity Act to the funding of monetary
damages only. The tax objectors advocate that the exclusion of injunctive
remedies from coverage under the Act is supported by legislative history.
Third, the tax objectors insist that using the Tort Immunity Act to fund
injunctive remedies is contrary to public policy.
With reference to the first point, the tax objectors argue that because the
Tort Immunity Act is a taxing statute, the Act, like all taxing statutes, must be
construed in favor of the taxpayer.7 6 Pursuant to Getto v. City of Chicago,"
the long-lasting rule has been that "[t]axing laws are to be strictly construed
and they are not to be extended beyond the clear import of the language used.
If there is any doubt in their application they will be construed most strongly
against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.'7
This narrow
interpretation of the Tort Immunity Act is crucial to the tax objectors' case
because, if the Act is viewed narrowly, the language used in the construction
of the Act must also be viewed narrowly and in a manner favoring the
taxpayer. When examining the statutory language used in the construction of
the Tort Immunity Act, the key focus for the tax objectors was on the term
"damages." The tax objectors argued that based on the plain meaning of the
term, "damages" does not include equitable remedies."

75.

See id

76. See Brief for Appellees at 8, In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist.
No. 205, for Years 1991 Through 1996,715 N.E.2d 1212 (I1. App. Ct. 1999) (No. 2-98-0706).
77. 396 N.E.2d 544 (I11.1979).
78. Id. at 550.
79. See Brief for Appellees at 9.
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Second, legislative history was another key factor to the tax objectors'
analysis. The tax objectors made two main points. First, they argued that
while the language "compensatory damages" was most likely added to section
9-102 to prevent liability of governmental entities for punitive damages, the
inclusion of the term "compensatory damages" is also significant because it
further clarified the General Assembly's intent to have the Act apply only to
traditional common law liability for damages.' Second, the tax objectors
pointed out that the failure of recent legislative proposals attempting to
exclude equitable remedies from the Tort Immunity Act are not indicative of
legislative intent. To the contrary, legislative intent cannot be interpreted from
proposals to the Tort Immunity Act, which were never subjected to a
legislative vote. Pursuant to Order of Railway Conductors of America v.
Swan,"' introduction of a bill has no probative value for purposes of statutory
construction or legislative intent.82 Therefore, based on valid and current
sections of the Tort Immunity Act, the intent of the legislature was not to
create a fund for relief other than traditional compensatory damages.
Third, the tax objectors argued that public policy supports a denial of the
use of the Tort Immunity Act to fund injunctive remedies because opening up
the Tort Immunity Act to include injunctive expenditures would undoubtedly
lead to abusive uses of the tort funds. By not limiting the Act to just
traditional damages, any expense could be justified once the "payment" and
"damages" language of the Act is disregarded."
Furthermore, if the Tort Immunity Act were allowed to fund injunctive
remedies, not only is the permissible range of expenses nearly unlimited, but
any local public entity's self-interest tends to dictate that it could be guilty on
as many fronts as possible to increase its own operating budget and revenue."
This entire concept goes against public policy. The Tort Immunity Act was
never designed to allow governmental units to levy a tax to pay for its own
equitable remedies. Thus, the Tort Immunity Act has no application in this
case.
To further this argument, the tax objectors noted that the district had
already been using Act funds to operate the entire school system, suggesting
that the district's actual experience with the funds collected under the Tort
Immunity Act has and will continue to lead to abusive spending practices by

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id at 57.
329 U.S. 520 (1947).
See id at 529; see also Brief for Appellees at 59.
See Brief for Appellees at 57-58.
See id. at 53.
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the district in an attempt to protect and promote its own programs." For
instance, tort funds in the Rockford school district are being used to pay for
$1,500.00 in supplies, $250.00 for a cooler and mineral water, $26.00 for an
annual subscription to a weekly African American newspaper, $120.00 for
cream puffs, and $2.2 million in legal fees." While these may be noteworthy
purposes for improving the quality of education for today's Rockford students,
public policy does not support this form of spending under the Act.
C. REPORT ON THE APPELLATE COURT DECISION

On August 18, 1999, Justice McLaren, writing for
the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Second District, held that injunctive and declaratory relief
obtained in a federal discrimination case did not constitute "compensatory
damages" under the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act. Thus, the appellate court ruled that the Rockford school district
did not have the authority under the Tort Immunity Act to levy a tax to pay for
the court-mandated desegregation and capital improvement remedies.8 7 In the
decision, the appellate court addressed three certified questions: (a)"'[w]hether
the Rockford School District . . . was authorized by the Illinois Local
Government Employees Tort Immunity Act... to levy taxes to fund remedies
agreed to by the District and/or ordered by the Federal Court in People Who
Care v. Rockford Board of Education ... .'; (b) "'[w]hether the [School]
District was authorized by the Tort Immunity Act to levy taxes to pay the debt
service on general obligation bonds issued to fund capital improvement
remedies agreed to by the district or ordered by the Federal Court in the People
Who Care case'; and (c) "'[w]hether [the] taxpayers are precluded from
85. See Id.at 51.

86. See id at 49-52. Additionally, using the tort fund, the district has also been able
to implement a whole array of other programs to benefit "all children enrolled in the Rockford
Public Schools": installation of chemistry laboratories in "all" high schools, including
equipment and supplies; purchase of chemistry lab equipment for "all" middle schools; purchase
of chemistry, algebra, biology, and English textbooks for "all" middle school students; purchase
of algebra and English supplies for "all" middle school students; installation of graphics and
computer labs at Roosevelt Alternative High School; a "total" revision of the curriculum from
kindergarten through the twelfth grade; staff development, including teacher training in such
subjects as "Discipline
With Dignity"; administrative staff, including "curriculum
coordinators" supported, according to the district's publication, by utterly "no General
Education Funds"; a "Family Support Center" for the "entire district," the entire staff of which
is "supported with Tort Funds"; all-day kindergartens; magnet schools; an early childhood
program; summer school for elementary, middle and high school levels; and transportation for
extracurricular activities. See it at 52-53. Although the district has laudable intentions, are
these programs really benefitting the victims or the minority students?
87. See In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist. No. 205, for Years 1991
Through 1996, 715 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
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challenging any of the aforesaid taxes under principles of res judicata or
The court answered questions (a) and (b) in the
collateral estoppel."'' s
negative and waived question (c). 9
The appellate court reached this negative determination of question (a)
in a three-part analysis of the Tort*Immunity Act. First, the appellate court
analyzed section 9-102 of the Act' to determine if the legislature's intent in
the creation of the Tort Immunity Act was to allow governmental entities to
levy taxes to pay for injunctive remedies. The key portion of section 9-102
that the appellate court examined states that local public entities are
empowered to "pay any tort judgment or settlement for compensatorydamages
for which it or an employee while acting within the scope of his employment
is liable in the manner provided in this Article." ' Therefore, the question for
the appellate court when studying this portion of the statute was whether or not
"compensatory damages" include injunctive remedies.
At this juncture in the appellate court's analysis, the Rockford school
district had been unable to locate any Illinois case in which injunctive relief
was subject to the Act.' Therefore, due to the lack of supporting case law, the
Rockford school district attempte4 to enlarge the definition of "compensatory
damages" by relying on OutboardMarine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Corp." The district took the approach that the term "damages," if interpreted
in its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, "connotes money one must expend
to remedy an injury for which he or she is responsible, irrespective of whether
that expenditure is compelled by a court of law in the form of compensatory
damages or by a court of equity in the form of compliance with mandatory
injunction.""4 Despite the school district's attempt to broaden the term
"damages" in the Act to include both compensatory damages and equitable
remedies, the appellate court distinguished OutboardMarine from the case at

88.
89.

90.

Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1216-18.

745 iL ComP. STAT. ANN. 10/9-102 (West 1993).

91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See Midwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Lakewood, 447 N.E.2d 1358 (Il.
App. Ct. 1983) (noting that the Village conceded that the Act did not provide immunity from
equitable relief; however, the court did not directly address whether the Act applied to

injunctive relief); Kepper v. LaSalle-Peru Township High Sch. Dist. No. 120,287 N.E.2d 180
(Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (applying the notice provision of the Tort Immunity Act to a suit in which

a mandatory injunction was sought along with other relief, but reviewing the request for
injunctive relief was outside the Act).
93. 607 N.E.2d 1204 (l. 1992). This case involved a comprehensive general liability
insurance policy wherein the court held that a mandatory injunction ordering the cleanup of

environmental harm would be considered damages. Id.
94. Id. at 1216.
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hand, determining that OutboardMarine's holding was limited in scope and
not applicable to interpretation of the Tort Immunity Act. The court stated that
"OutboardMarine did not involve the [Tort Immunity] Act. Its analysis did
not involve the interpretation of a statute but the interpretation of a specific
insurance policy between two contracting parties."'5 According to this
appellate court, the conclusion reached in OutboardMarine that "damages"
includes both legal and equitable relief, was a limited holding that is not
applicable to all legal areas."
Moreover, the appellate court went on to explain that injunctive relief is
something completely separate from monetary damages. The court notes that
"according to our Supreme Court, compensatory damages and injunctive relief
are not the same."" The Illinois Supreme Court separates injunctive relief
from compensatory damages by illustrating the differences between these two
remedies. First, a settlement or a judgment resulting in a compensatory
damages award requires that a certain amount of money be paid. The award
is both definite and certain. In the case of an injunctive remedy, no set
monetary award is determined at the time of the judgment or settlement.
When injunctive remedies are awarded it is difficult to ascertain the actual
monetary cost of the remedy until compliance is complete." For example, in
the People Who Care case, not until the construction is finished, the new
teachers are hired, and all the workshops on cultural diversity have taken place
will the district be able to determine the revenue that was necessary to be in
full compliance with the court-mandated injunctive remedy. Therefore, the
appellate court concluded that the legislature never planned to have this type
of open'-ended relief financed by the unregulated ability to tax that is
contemplated by the Act."
Furthermore, compensatory damages can be distinguished from equitable
remedies because compensatory damages are paid out to a third party. In the
case of compensatory damages, a governmental entity needs to levy funds
under the Tort Immunity Act to pay a third party who has been injured. In the
case of an injunctive award, like the award in this case, the raid on the public
treasury would be conducted by the school district for its own use. The
appellate court held that the Act was never meant to fund this type of relief. °°
95.

See In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist. No. 205, for Years 1991

Through 1996, 715 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Di. App. Ct. 1999) [hereinafter In re Consol.
ObjectionsJ].

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See
See
See
See
See

Id.
at 1216.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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The second part of the appellate court's analysis in limiting the
application of the Tort Immunity Act to injunctive remedies dealt with the
legislative history of the Act. The appellate court, while conceding that the
legislature did not specifically prohibit the funding of injunctive remedies
through the Tort Immunity Act, nevertheless pointed out that the legislature
never specifically stated that the Act can in fact be used to fund injunctive
remedies. Due to the ambiguity in the legislative history over the funding of
injunctive remedies under the Tort Immunity Act, the appellate court turned
to case law to clarify the intent of the legislature. The appellate court, relying
on Anderson v. Sutter, ' determined that Illinois courts have long held that the
Act did not authorize the funding of injunctive relief.'"
Next, the appellate court addressed the new amendment to the Act that
the legislature passed, but had not yet been signed into law at the time of this
appellate court's decision. 1" The new amendment to section 9-107 would add:
"[T]he purpose of this Section is to provide an extraordinary tax for funding
expenses relating to tort liability, insurance and risk management programs."'"
This new amendment was significant because if the amendment passed it could
signal that the legislature's intent was to broaden the funding under the Act to
include not only expenses relating to compensatory damages, but all damages
relating to tort liability.
However, because the new amendment had not yet been signed into law,
the appellate court could only deal with the proposed legislative intent in a
hypothetical sense. First, the appellate court pointed out that even if the new
amendment passed it would not be applied retroactively." Thus, the new

amendment would not affect the outcome of the case at hand. Second, the

appellate court pointed out that they believed the intent of the legislature was
not to broaden the meaning of the Tort Immunity Act to include funding for
injunctive remedies. In fact, the appellate court stressed that the intent of the
legislature in proposing the new amendment to the Act was to narrow the
appropriate uses of the Tort Immunity Act. "This amendment is not a
broadening of the Act. It shows a legislative policy that the Act, which has a
limited purpose, is not to be constantly expanded to find new ways to spend

101. 458 N.E.2d 39, 43 (I1.App. Ct. 1983) (holding that notice requirements of the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity'Act do not apply to a suit
for an injunction since the Act provides that "[nlothing in this Act affects the right to obtain
relief other than damages against a local public entity or public employee" and injunctive relief
is "relief other than damages").
102. See Inre Consol. Objections, 715 N.E.2d at 1217.
103. S.B. 941, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (IBl.1999).
104. Act of Aug. 19, 1999, P.A. 91-628, § 9-107, 1999 II. Legis. Serv. 5084 (West).
105. See In re Consol. Objections, 715 N.E.2d at 1217.
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Therefore, the appellate court reached the

conclusion that the recent legislative amendment was not intended to broaden

the Act, but was instead proposed to further limit the use of the funds collected
under the Tort Immunity Act.
Finally, the appellate court concluded that the Tort Immunity Act would
not violate public policy if it did not include funding for injunctive remedies.
The court reached this conclusion despite strong public policy arguments that
considerable harm would result if the Tort Immunity Act was not allowed to
fund injunctive remedies, such as forcing the federal government to become
involved in state and local issues, delaying vindication of citizens' rights,
07
decreasing governmental accountability, and wasting public resources.' The

appellate court held that these public policy concerns were not strong enough

to overturn established state law. "While these may be laudable ends to be
achieved, they cannot be reached at the expense of the law."' 0 8 The appellate
court reasoned that other avenues already existed for the school district to raise
the funds necessary to be in compliance with the court-mandated order. The
appellate court suggested local tax referendums or federal intervention to raise
the state statutory taxing limit.'"
Turning to certified question (b), the court reached the same conclusion
by applying the same analysis as applied to question (a). The court reasoned
that if the district did not have the authority to levy taxes to fund stipulated
remedies, then under the same analysis, the district would not have the
authority to levy taxes to pay the debt service on general obligation bonds
issued to fund capital improvement remedies."' Lastly, the appellate court
declined to answer question (c), finding the issue to be waived."'
D. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE APPELLATE COURT OPINION

Appropriately, the decision of the appellate court is logically reasoned
and factually sound yet it is not practically based. The appellate court supports
its position that the Tort Immunity Act should not be used to fund injunctive
remedies by linking together two specific arguments. First, the appellate court
supports its decision by examining the statutory construction of the Act.
Second, the appellate court renders its decision based on the legislative history
of the Tort Immunity Act. However, the appellate court's argument falters in
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id.
See id. at 1217; see also Brief for Appellants at 52.
See In re Consol. Objections, 715 N.E.2d at 1217.
See id.
See id. at 1218.
See id.
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the analysis of the public policy concerns, which highlight the importance of
the school district having a consistent financial source to pay for injunctive
remedies.
The appellate court's analysis of the statutory construction of the Tort
Immunity Act is persuasive because it is able to view the Tort Immunity Act
independently. This neutral position allows the appellate court to simply
analyze the plain meaning of the language and phrases used in the construction
of the Tort Immunity Act.
An important provision that the appellate court analyzes is section 2-101
of the Act, which clearly states: "[N]othing in this Act affects the right to
obtain relief other than damages against a local public entity or public

employee.""' This phrase is significant because, on its face, it appears that the

only type of relief allowed to be funded under the Act is "damages." The Act
does not allow for the funding of "relief other than damages." The question

then is: Are injunctive remedies "damages"? According to a long line of
Illinois case law, injunctive relief is "relief other than damages.""'

Thus,

taking this line of thinking to its logical conclusion, injunctive relief is not
allowed under the Tort Immunity Act because it is something other than
damages.

Nevertheless, the appellate court's construction of the Tort Immunity Act

is not infallible. There is also substantial case law indicating that the term

"damages" may include the payment for injunctive remedies." 4 Therefore,

due to the conflicting case law supporting both interpretations of the term
"damages," the analysis must next turn to legislative intent, when a statute's
meaning is not decisive from the plain meaning of the language.
As indicated above, when examining the legislative history of the Tort
Immunity Act, there have been two very significant changes to the Act. The
first change took place in November of 1986 when the General Assembly
modified the language of the Act by replacing the term "damages" with
"compensatory damages." ' Based on the transcription of the debate in the
House of Representatives on June 30, 1986, it appears that the legislature's
112. 745 ILL COMP. STAT. 10/2-101 (West 1993) (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 692 N.E.2d 369 (111. App. Ct.
1998), rev'd on other grounds, 703 N.E.2d 883 (1998); Romano v. Village of Glenview, 660
N.E.2d 56 (M.App. Ct. 1995); Anderson v. Sutter, 458 N.E.2d 39 (111. App. Ct. 1983).
114. See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204,1216
(Il1.1992) (finding that the term "damages" was ambiguous, that the distinction between equity
and law was outdated, and that a common understanding of the term could include injunctive
remedies if one examined the intent of the parties); see alsoIn re Celotex Corp., 152 B.R. 652,
660 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident. & Indem. Co., 673 F.
Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987).
115. Act of Nov. 25, 1986, P.A. 84-1431, § 9-102, 1986 U.Laws 3748.
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intent in changing the Act was to ensure that governmental entities would not
be responsible for punitive damage awards." 6 At this point, the legislature did
not reference whether injunctive remedies were included as compensatory
damages. However, the second modification to the Act makes it clear that the
legislative intent was to limit the Tort Immunity Act as a funding mechanism.
The second relevant change to the Act came with the legislature's
proposal to section 9-107.7 The legislature's intent in proposing the new
amendment to section 9-107 was to further specify the appropriate uses for the
Tort Immunity Act and to prevent abuse of the Act." 8 The legislature included
in the Act the purpose for the recent addition by stating: "[Tihe purpose of this
Section is to provide an extraordinary tax for funding expenses relating to tort
liability, insurance, and risk management programs.. . . [Ilt has become
apparent that some units of local government are using the tax revenue to fund
expenses more properly paid from general operating funds."" 9
Based on the above statement by the legislature, it is clear that the
legislature proposed this change to the Act specifically to curb the use of tax
revenues for things other than tort liabilities. Specifically, the legislature
wanted to limit usage of the Tort Immunity Act as a funding mechanism to
only those purposes expressly authorized under the Act; any other use of the
Act not authorized under section 9-107 would be improper. The legislature
further clarified their intent to limit the Tort Immunity Act by indicating how
section 9-107 should be interpreted. "The provisions of this Section shall be
strictly construed consistent with this declaration and the Act's express
purposes. '""2 Therefore, the appellate court's holding in this case is
convincing because of the clear legislative intent to limit the purposes of the
Tort Immunity Act.
Additionally, the appellate court's decision is rational because the court
is instituting a solution that does not subvert the customary adversarial
relationship between the plaintiff, defendant, and court system. If the appellate
court had determined that the Tort Immunity Act would be an acceptable
funding mechanism for injunctive remedies, then there would be little
incentive for the school district to defend itself against desegregation suits. As
long as the federal courts are augmenting the school district's budget with
judicially imposed taxes, why should the school district try and defend

116.
117.

118.
119.
120.

See Brief for Appellants at 41.
Act of Aug. 19, 1999, P.A. 91-628, § 9-107, 1999 111. Legis. Serv. 5084 (West).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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themselves? The judicial system should not support a policy that encourages
corruption and waste of taxpayer money.
Nonetheless, the appellate court's last argument is their weakest. The
appellate court does not fully consider the practical impact of their decision on
the victims in this case, the minority students. The appellate court's holding
that the Tort Immunity Act can no longer be used to fund the desegregation
remedies completely eliminates the Rockford school district's current funding
mechanism. Immediately, a new issue is raised that the appellate court's
decision does not fully address. How will the Rockford school district pay for
these court-mandated desegregation remedies?
First, while the appellate court suggests that the school district has at least
two alternative solutions whereby the district can obtain funding for these
desegregation remedies, the appellate court never considers the practical
reality of these alternative funding mechanisms. The first suggestion by the
appellate court is that the school district can pass a local referendum to pay for
the injunctive remedies.121 A school district with taxpayers already saddled
with one of the highest property tax rates in the country is unlikely to
voluntarily accept another tax increase.' 22 Realistically, the school district is
down to its last option federal intervention.
The last alternative proposed by the appellate court is a Missouri v.
Jenkins remedy." ' The appellate court's decision leads one to believe that the
Jenkins remedy is an automatic solution to the district's funding quandary.
This is not the case. Before the district would ever be able to receive any
funding under a Jenkins remedy, the district would have to engage in
exhaustive efforts to prove that there were no other methods of funding
available to pay for the desegregation remedies. This process would be both
time-consuming and cost-ineffective for the district, while further delaying a
constitutional right of the minority students, the right to a timely remedy.'
Realistically, the district is out of funding options. The district can no more
ignore the appellate court's prohibition on levying the tort tax than it can
ignore an order entered by the federal court to desegregate.
121. See In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist. No. 205, for Years 1991
through 1996, 715 N.E.2d 1212, 1217 (Il1. App. Ct. 1999) [hereinafter In re Consol.
Objections].
122. See Court Rejects Rockford Tax Used for Desegregation, STATE JOURNALREGISTER (Springfield, I.), Aug. 20, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 23247307. The citizens of
the Rockford district have already rejected a $36 million dollar referendum to help cover
desegregation costs. Id.
123. 495 U.S. 33 (1990); see also supra note 70.
124. See ILL CONST. art. I, §12 ("Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws
for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property, or regulation. He
shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.").
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Furthermore, the appellate court's decision is tenuous because its holding
is limited. The decision of the appellate court really only addresses the issue
of how desegregation remedies are funded. The appellate court's decision
does not address the issue of whether or not school districts will be allowed to
use the money collected under the Tort Immunity Act to fund safety gear to
protect the school district from initial tort liability. For example, will the
Rockford school districts be allowed to use tort immunity funds to pay for new
football helmets? Will these payments be viewed as "preventive remedies"
and no longer fall under the Tort Immunity Act? Or are these new helmets
considered "compensatory damages," thus allowing the Rockford school
district to continue to provide the newest in athletic equipment to their
students? Since the appellate court's decision is limited in application, its
usefulness is also limited as precedent for future school districts who are still
being allowed to supplement their ordinary operating budget with funds from
the Tort Immunity Act.
s
The over-arching goal of the judicial system since Plessy v. Ferguson"
was unanimously overturned by Brown v. Board of Education" has been to
provide all students with equal educational opportunities. In practical terms,
this is exactly what the Rockford school district is attempting to do. However,
the appellate court has determined that the school district's current method of
funding the remedies is illegal. Since no other funding mechanisms are
currently available, the appellate court has made the remedies mandated by the
People Who Care case almost impossible to provide.
IV. PRACTICAL EFFECTs OF THE DECISION
A. ROCKFORD COMMUNITY CONCERNS

When a large portion of the Rockford community consisting of more than
16,000 taxpayers, the Rockford school district, and the minority students of the
school system originally filed suit, all of the parties were seeking a decision
from the judicial system that addressed more than just a statutory interpretation
125.

163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy was the landmark case concerning a Louisiana law

which prohibited "colored persons" and whites from riding together in the same railway
compartments. This historical decision first verbalized and allowed the "separate but equal"
doctrine. See id. at 540, 541.
126. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This was the watershed case wherein the plaintiffs were
African Americans from four different states challenging the permitted or mandated racial
segregation in their public schools. The Supreme Court determined that the doctrine enunciated
in Plessy v. Ferguson of "separate but equal" was inherently unequal, and ordered the
desegregation of all schools.
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of the Tort Immunity Act. The taxpayers were seeking answers to complex
community concerns that had been plaguing the entire Rockford community.
Unfortunately, for all three of these groups the decision reached by the
appellate court on August 18, 1999, cannot be claimed as a victory by any one
of the parties. Everyone lost.
Even though the appellate court has reached a decision that, on its face,
appears to be favorable to the tax objectors in this case, in reality, the decision
has not addressed the underlying concerns of the taxpayers. The appellate
court, in reaching its decision that tort immunity funds can no longer be used
to fund injunctive remedies, has answered only half of the question for
taxpayers. The impact of the appellate court's decision now leaves the
taxpayers with a new question: What about Missouri v. Jenkins?2 7 If the
judicial system allows a Jenkins remedy, then the taxpayers have gained
nothing from their efforts because in the end the Rockford taxpayers will still
be required to pay for these desegregation remedies.
Also, taxpayers are concerned that continued court battles and court costs
from the appellate court's decision will only lead to further expenditures of
money at an increasing cost to the taxpayers. Therefore, even though a
decision has been reached in this case, taxpayers will most likely pay more in
the end. In essence, the taxpayer loses.
Next, the appellate court's decision does not favor the minority students
either. The appellate court's decision has left the school district with no way
to pay for the desegregation remedies that have been awarded to the minority
students. Because it is unlikely that a school referendum will pass allowing
the district to raise enough funds to pay for the court-mandated remedies and
because a Jenkins remedy is neither quick or certain, all the appellate court has
successfully done is further delay justice to the minority students. Until an
acceptable alternative funding mechanism can be found, the minority students
lose under the appellate court decision.
Finally, the Rockford community as a whole has not benefitted from the
appellate court's decision. First, the Rockford community still faces
excruciating exposure because of the possibility of an appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court. Second, the Rockford community continues to suffer under
high levels of property taxes partially caused by a decade of battling over the
funding of these desegregation remedies. Surveys cited by both Yahoo! Real
Estate"u and Runzheimer International'2 list Rockford as having one of the
127.
128.

495 U.S. 33 (1990); see also supra note 70.
-Yahoo!

Real Estate City Comparison, at http:U/verticals.yahoo.comlcities/cate-

gories/proptaxrate.htmnl (last visited Jan. 4, 2000). This page provides a city comparison of the
average annual property tax rate based on its Internet database. As of the date the page was last.
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highest real estate tax rates in the nation, approximately 3.6%."
Rockford
for
the
taxes
of
property
levels
continuation of these heightened
community could have devastating consequences. Most likely, a continuation
of these high property taxes caused by either the Tort Immunity Act or a
Jenkins remedy could force the abandonment of a once well-established
community. The Rockford community loses too.

B. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT CONCERNS

The most obvious flaw in the appellate opinion, as stated earlier, is that
the appellate court does not fully consider the necessary public policy issues
requiring the continuation of school desegregation. If the Illinois Supreme
Court reviews this case and affirms the decision of the appellate court, then the
question for the Illinois Supreme Court becomes: Where will the money for
these remedies come from? The most probable answer, of course, is federal
intervention under Jenkins.
However, if the Illinois Supreme Court determines that Illinois is not
guilty of intentional discrimination, according to United States v. Board of
Education of the City of Chicago,3' the Jenkins remedy is unavailable as a
solution. If this is the case, there is little the Rockford school district can do
to satisfy the mandate of People Who Care.
Moreover, even if the Rockford school district fulfills all of the
requirements of a Jenkins remedy and the Illinois Supreme Court determines
that Jenkins is an appropriate remedy, the court still has to contend with the
constitutionality of a Jenkins remedy. According to the quote at the beginning
of this casenote, in the words of Alexander Hamilton, the purse is to be

visited, Rockford, Illinois was listed as the highest property tax rate at 3.6%. See also Rockford
School Tax Protest Home Page, at http://members.aol.com/mikobr (last visited Jan. 4,2000)
[hereinafter Tax Protest Home Page].

129.

Runzheimer International is an international management consulting firm

specializing in transportation, travel, and living costs. See Runzheimer International, at
http://www.nmzheimer.com/corpc/about/scriptsabout.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2000); see also
Tax Protest Home Page, supra note 128.
130. See Tax Protest Home Page, supra note 128.

For the last several years, the owner of a $150,000 Rockford home has
paid over $800 per year in property taxes just for the remedies in this
single lawsuit more than twice as much as the homeowner pays for the

entire county government structure. If[the] taxpayers win the appeal, the
Id.

average refund for those who have joined in the tax protest will be
approximately $383 per protesting property for each year since 1992.

131.

11 F.3d668(7thCir. 1993).
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controlled by the legislature." Our constitutional system was designed to
have three branches of government with limited powers to ensure that no one
branch of government dominated. Under a Jenkins remedy, the judiciary may
be overstepping the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution. The
power of taxation is a power reserved solely for the states and its elected
representatives. Under a Jenkins solution, the judicial system is circumventing
the power of the legislature. The Illinois Supreme Court will have to prove
that federal intervention into a state's taxing power is constitutional under
Jenkins.
If the Illinois Supreme Court does not support the Tort Immunity Act or
a Jenkins remedy as an alternative funding mechanism, then the court will
have to address other methods of funding to pay for the judicially mandated
desegregation of the Rockford school district. Otherwise, school segregation
will continue until an alternative financial source can be found. Consequently,
the minority students, the victims of this segregation and discrimination, will
not be vindicated.
Furthermore, if the Illinois Supreme Court examines this case from the
practical side of the law, they will discover that the minority students in the
Rockford school district have already waited for over a decade to have
desegregation policies put into place. Certainly, while there is still the
possibility that the federal government can get involved under Jenkins, how
much longer should these minority students have to wait for justice? The
Illinois Supreme Court must understand that if they force the school district to
fashion another remedy to raise the necessary funds, it could be another decade
before the district is in full compliance with the mandated court order.
Not only will the Illinois Supreme Court have to address the issue of new
methods of funding to pay for these millions of dollars of desegregation
remedies, but the Illinois Supreme Court will also have to address how the
money already collected will be returned to the taxpayers. This task will not
be a simple one for the district either. The Illinois Supreme Court will have
to keep in mind that any decision terminating the use of the Tort Immunity Act
as a funding mechanism for injunctive remedies and forcing the district to
return to the taxpayers the money that it has collected over the past decade
may jeopardize the financial stability of the entire school district.
Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court, if it decides to hear this case, has
more than just an interpretation of a statutory law with which to contend. A

132.

See TiE FEDERAusT No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); supra text accompanying note
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decision by the Illinois Supreme Court will affect the social, political, and

financial framework of an entire community.

V. CoNCLUSION

For the Rockford school district, the holding of the appellate court in
August of 1999 that the district could no longer use the Tort Immunity Act to
fund desegregation remedies has placed the district in a "Catch 22." The
school district can only comply with the appellate court decision if they defy
the federal order mandating the district desegregation. The district can only
comply with the federal order if they have a way to raise the funds. The
appellate court reaches their decision by fully analyzing the statutory
construction and legislative history of the Tort Immunity Act. However, the
appellate court does not provide the Rockford school district a new funding
mechanism with which to raise the necessary funds to fulfill the courtihandated order that the district desegregate.
Ultimately, if education is to be the foundation for success in the new
millennium, then the parties involved in this suit and the judicial system
should push to better the everyday aspects of the Rockford school system
instead of engaging in legal entanglements that only delay the effective
enforcement of equal education for all students.
CHRISTINA M. CANTLIN-VANWIGGEREN

